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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes theory and evidence on the relationship between in°a-
tion and the bank's portfolio allocation. The proposed idea rationalized what
Rodriguez (1992) pointed out with respect to the Central Bank of Argentina, be-
having as a "borrower of ¯rst resort", where banks reallocated their investment
from the private sector to government bonds.
A main component of in°ation costs is the misallocation of resources, this
paper shows a channel through the reallocation of credits, where the credit
market for the private sector trend to disappear.
Theoretically, this paper studies the behavior of risk-neutral ¯nanciers in
a world in which monitoring costs, and limited liability on the part of ¯rms
leads to credit rationing equilibria. In light of the well established relation be-
tween in°ation and changes in relative prices, the theoretical model rationalizes
the relationship between in°ation and the allocation of capital in the banking
system. Empirically, it looks at the dynamic behavior of the composition of
bank's assets in Argentina between 1983 and 1998, which shows a robust rela-
tionship between relative price variability and bank's allocation in government
denominated assets.
11 Introduction
The Latin-American experience revealed the destructive e®ect of the in°ation
on the economy.1 There are two well-known in°ation costs due to the costs of
changing prices (Fender, 1990) : i) the cost of changing prices itself, and ii)
the cost of a misallocation of resources due to the greater °uctuation in relative
price. This paper shows a channel for the misallocation of resources generated
by in°ation, where the misallocation comes from reallocation of credit lines from
private ¯rms to the government.
Taking into account the well established positive correlation between in°a-
tion and relative price variability, the paper claims that an increase in relative
price variability change the bank's incentive from making loans to private ¯rms
to invest in government bonds. The driving mechanism is that an increase in
relative price variability increases the default probability of ¯rms, which make
banks reluctant to give loans to private ¯rms generating a credit constraint
equilibria. In other words, the market for private credit disappears. This resul
is in the line of Casella and Feinstein (1990), where the authors showed that in
at high in°ation rates the volume of transaction fall.
This bank's asset reallocation was already pointed out by Rodriguez (1992).
Rodriguez explained how the Central Bank of Argentina in the late 80's came to
be the "borrower of ¯rst resort". In those times, according to Rodriguez, banks
prefered to invest in government bonds instead of making loans to ¯rms, because
banks perceived trading with the government to be less risky than trading with
t h ep r i v a t es e c t o r .T h e r ea r es o m ef a n c ys t o r i e si nt h el i n eo fw h a tR o d r i g u e z
called a borrower of ¯rst resort. For example, the Central Bank of Argentina
once wanted to reduce the remunerated reserve requirements, but banks started
to criticize this policy claiming that it would destroy the banking system.
A competitive theory for this episodes was presented by Calvo and Vegh
(1995). The authors explained that sometimes government used the interest
rate to ¯ght in°ation and defend the currency in many high in°ation countries.
For the special case of Argentina, they showed that, ¯rst, commercial banks
borrowed from the public in time deposit, and second, banks deposited this
m o n e yi nt h eC e n t r a lB a n k .T h e n ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eC e n t r a lB a n ki n t e r e s tr a t e
creates incentive to the public to invest in time deposit, and banks reinvest the
m o n e yi nt h eC e n t r a lb a n k .
This paper proposes theory and evidence on the relationship between in-
1An interesting fact about in°ation is that there is a huge literature discussing not only the
cost of in°ation itself, but also the cost when the government try to get ride of it. Calvo and
Vegh (1998) present a comprehensive summary of the second issue, the cost of government
policies to eliminate in°ation. In their summary, in°ation is classi¯ed in two types: hyperin-
°ation and chronic in°ation. Among the di®erence between these two types of in°ation, the
empirical literature found that is cheaper to eliminate the in°ation from an hyperin°ation
process than from a chronic in°ation process. Examples of reducing in°ation from an hyper-
in°ation case can be Germany in the 20', Bolivia in the 80', Argentina in the 90'. In these
countries the in°ation rate fall overnight at no output cost. On the other hand, the empirical
literature shows that reducing in°ation from a chronic situation generates an output cost,
where this cost is independent to the stabilization plan used (exchange rate or money base).
2°ation and the allocation of bank's assets. Empirically, taking into account
stylized fact of the positive correlation between in°ation and relative price vari-
ability, the paper looks at the dynamic behavior of the composition of bank's
assets in Argentina between 1983-1998, and it ¯nds a robust relationship be-
tween relative price variability and the fraction of bank's portfolio invested in
government denominated assets. The e®ects of the relative price variability on
bank's portfolio allocation is presented in the data even when we control for the
level of economic activity and for the size of the budget de¯cit.
Formally, this paper argues that in markets with asymmetric information
and limited liability on the parts of borrowers, changes in relative price disper-
sion are likely to a®ect bank's pro¯tability and the allocation of bank's asset,
in a way consistent with credit rationing equilibria in markets with imperfect
information(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In this context, the paper studies the
behavior of risk-neutral ¯nanciers in a world in which bankruptcy risk and ad-
verse selection on the part of borrowers produce a non monotonic relationship
between the ¯nancier's expected pro¯t and the interest rate. The logic of the
argument is the following: when ¯rm's failure is costly to the lender (e.g. cost
of a bankruptcy), an increase in the loan rate of interest may decrease the net
return to the bank, since it increases the probability of failure of the borrower2.
In this environment, the allocation of bank's portfolio between the risky asset
and the alternative risk free asset depends not only on the di®erence between the
expected return of the two assets, but also on the variance of the risky asset's
return3. We show that when ¯nanciers are heterogeneous with respect to the
monitoring costs, in the spirit of Williamson (1987), an increase in the variance
of a mean preserving distribution of returns induces a portfolio reallocation
towards the risk free asset. In addition, the real interest rate charged to risky
borrowers rises, in a way consistent with the time series evidence on lending rate
in Argentina. This paper argues that this mechanism, albeit neglected by the
previous literature on in°ation, can rationalize the relation between in°ation
and bank lending in Argentina, and is a potentially important (and costly)
element of the real e®ect of in°ation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 looks at the bank's portfolio
allocation in Argentina, and the behavior of the interest rate from 1983 to 1998.
Section 2.3 shows the existing evidence on the relation between in°ation and
relative prices, with particular reference to Argentina. Section 2.4 presents the
theoretical model describing the relation between lender and borrowers. Section
2.5 concludes.
2See Williamson, 1987 for the microeconomic description of the mechanism we focus on.
The macroeconomic implication of a non monotonic relationship between bank's pro¯t and
the lending rate have been discussed by Mankiw (1986) and by Bernanke and Gertler (1990)
3T h ev a r i a n c ei sr e p r e s e n t e db yt h ep r i c el e v e lv a r i a b i l i t y
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The theoretical model, presented section 2.4, shows that the relation between
in°ation and bank's asset allocation is based on the e®ect of the relative price
variability on the bank's asset allocation. This section provides some empirical
evidence on the relationship between bank's asset allocation and relative price
variability in Argentina for the period between 1983 and 1998.
This section shows the graphic relation between in°ation and bank's asset
allocation. The main idea behind this graph is that an increase in relative price
variability increases the default probability of ¯rms, which make banks reluctant
to give loans to private ¯rms. So, given by the well established positive cor-
relation between in°ation and relative price variability, an increase in in°ation
will incentive banks to constrain credit from ¯rms. As result, the market for
private credit disappears. This situation was already pointed out by Rodriguez
(1992). Rodriguez explained how the Central Bank of Argentina in the late
80' becomes to be the "borrower of ¯rst resort". In those time, according to
Rodriguez, banks prefer to invest in government bonds instead of making loans
to ¯rms because banks noted less risk trading with the government than trading
with the private sector.
A competitive theory for this episodes was presented by Calvo and Vegh
(1995). The authors explained that sometimes government used the interest
rate to ¯ght in°ation and defend the currency in many high in°ation countries.
For the special case of Argentina, they showed that, ¯rst, commercial banks
borrowed from the public in time deposit, and second, banks deposited this
m o n e yi nt h eC e n t r a lB a n k .T h e n ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eC e n t r a lB a n ki n t e r e s tr a t e
creates incentive to the public to invest in time deposit, and banks reinvest the
m o n e yi nt h eC e n t r a lb a n k .
We explicitly consider Argentina because of its large swing in in°ation over
the last 15 years. For several decades, Argentina had been classi¯ed as a chronic
in°ation country, and in the late 80's experienced also hyperin°ation, with quar-
terly in°ation reaching 334 percent in the ¯rst quarter of 1990. However, since
1991, Argentina recorded an unprecedented change in the economic policies.
With the introduction of the Convertibility Plan, dated in March 1991, in°ation
rate rapidly drop below 10 percent and stabilized below 1 percent per quarter
since 1995. These large swings is observed in both, in°ation and relative price
variability plotted in graph 2.1.
The propose of this section is to analyze the e®ects of the relative price
variability on the asset allocation in the banking system. For this purpose we
de¯ne Kbs
t as the proportion of bank assets invested in government denominated
assets. More formally, if privt are the banking sector claims on the private sector
at time t, pubt are the claims on central government, and Kbs
t is de¯ned as the







4We used the data from the International Financial Statistics. With reference
to equation 2.1, we distinguish between two di®erent levels of aggregation.
More speci¯cally, pubt refers to claims on central government (rows 52an and
22an), while privt refers to claims on private sector (rows 52d and 22d)4.I n
addition, we will also use the real GDP and the government quarterly ¯nancing
needs (row 84a).
Figure 2.2 plots the series Kbs
t between 1983 and 1998. This graph shows
that the bank's asset allocation experiences a large swing over the entire sample,
raising during the pre-convertibility period and falling during the 90's. Table 2.1
reports a summary statistic for the aggregate variables of our analysis. Quarterly
in°ation averaged 42 percent over the full sample, with remarkable di®erences
between the pre-convertibility plan period, where it averaged more than 75
percent, and the latter part of the sample, where quarterly in°ation fell to 3
percent per quarter. Over the same sub-sample period, Kbs
t followed a similar
pattern, with an overall average equal to 28 percent.
In addition, table 2.1 reports also simple correlations, and shows that the
contemporaneous correlation between relative price variability (RPV )a n dKbs
t
is 0.54 for the entire sample, raising to 0.82 in the 90s, suggesting that the
correlation is also present in the low in°ation period.




In°ation (¼)4 2 . 3 7
De¯cit (d)- . 0 3
GDP Growth (g)2 . 9 9
Corr(kbs;RPV). 5 4
Corr(kbs;d). 3 0
Corr(kbs;g)- . 2 1
High In°ation Period: 1983.q1-1991.q1
kbs .30
In°ation (¼)7 6 . 3
Corr(kbs;RPV)0 . 5 3
Low In°ation Period: 1991.q1-1998.q1
kbs 25.8
In°ation (¼)3 . 6
Corr(kbs;RPV)0 . 8 2
Source: International Financial Statistics and INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Es-
tadisticas y Censos-Argentina)
To gain intuition, each of the ¯gure 2.3 and 2.4 plots a scatter diagram of
Kbs
t and the log of in°ation5. The di®erence between these two graphs is that
¯gure 2.3 included the whole sample, while graph 2.4 only the information where
4Throughout the analysis Kbs
t refers to row 22
5Since quarterly in°ation in the 90s has negative values, we make a monotonic transfor-
mation of in°ation, ¼t =l n ( 1+~ ¼t), where ~ ¼t i st h eo b s e r v e di n ° a t i o na tt i m et .
5log of in°ation is less than 0.2. The goal of this split is to show the relation
between these variables clearly. In both graphs we observe that an increase
in the in°ation rate relates to an increase in the proportion of free risk assets
invested by banks.
Figure 2.5 plots relative price variability and Kbs
t , which is the relation we
want to test. Despite the fact these graphs show a clear relation between the
variables, next section would try to understand whether the positive relationship
observed in the raw data is spurious, or if this relation results from the bank's
pro¯t maximization process.
2.0.1 Methodology
The empirical analysis involves regressing Kbs
t on relative price variability, con-
trolling for output growth and the government budget de¯cit. Formally we
estimate,
Kbs



















t is the ratio given by equation 2.1, RPVt is the relative price
variability, gi is the output growth rate, dt is the government budget de¯cit
as percentage of the GDP and x is a set of regressors that control for possible
non linearities and structural breaks in the time series. Data range from ¯rst
quarter of 1983 to the ¯rst quarter of 1998.
The regression in equation 2.2 has two potential problems. The ¯rst one
concerns the choice of the appropriate lag structure, and the second one has to do
with the degree of integration of the selected time series. While the ¯rst problem
is addressed by applying the Akaike and Schwarz criteria to optimally select
M,N,Q and R, the non-stationarity of the regressors is potentially more serious.
The risk is that the relationship plotted in ¯gure 2.5 could be spurious and
that the two variables will not be cointegrated. Ex-ante, however, we would not
expect the ratio Kbs
t to be a non stationary variable. In addition, Kbs
t is bounded
between 0 and 1 by construction. Nevertheless, it may be the case that in the
relative short period of investigation, the stochastic process describing Kbs
t be
statistically indistinguishable from a non-stationary process. For this purpose,
we apply the two-stage procedure proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith(1996).
The procedure consists in using the error correction speci¯cation of equation
2.2, and performs a variable deletion test on the coe±cients on the lagged levels
of Kbs
t , RPVt, gt, and, dt. The null hypothesis is the non-existence of a long
run relationship, in other words, the instability of the model.
This procedure allows us to avoid the pre-testing problems associated with
the standard cointegrating analysis, which requires the unequivocal classi¯cation
of variables into I(0) and I(1). More speci¯cally, we re-write equation 2.2 in the
error correction form
64Kbs
t = c + µkbs




















and we perform an F test on the lagged level values of Kbs
t¡1, RPVt¡1, gt¡1,
and, dt¡1. The test is the non-existence of a long run relationship.
2.1 Results
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the results of our regressions. For the purpose of our
analysis, the most important result in these tables is given by the stability test
of table 2.3, which test the null hypothesis of a long run relationship.
In table 2.2, we report two di®erent speci¯cations for equation 2.2. The
¯rst speci¯cation, is the basic regression of equation 2.2 without any additional
regressor x. The second speci¯cation includes a dummy CB that takes the value
of 1 for the period following the Convertibility law (March 91). Table 2.2 shows
that both RPVt and dt are important determinants of the allocation of capital
in the banking system, while the role of the output growth does not appear to be
signi¯cant. In addition, controlling for the implementation of the convertibility
law seems to be not important.
Table 2.2: Bank's Capital Allocation
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Portfolio
Invested in Government Denominated Assets
Quarterly Data: 1983.q1-1998.q1
Basic Structure CB Dummy
Regressor Parameter Coe±cient t-ratio Coe±cient t-ratio
kbs
t¡1 ® 0.78*** 12.68 0.78*** 12.43
RPVt ¯1 0.64*** 2.77 .67** 2.02
gt ± -0.01* -1.82 {.01* {1.80
dt ¾1 0.27*** 2.84 0.27*** 2.62
Const. a 0.05*** 3.60 .05*** 2.91
CB .01 .10
Note: One, two and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance
a tt h e1 0 ,5a n d1p e r c e n tr e s p e c t i v e l y .
Table 2.3 reports the coe±cients of the long run relationship between Kbs
t
and the other aggregate variables. This table shows that relative price variability
is the only variable that is persistently signi¯cant at a signi¯cance level of 5%.
7The speci¯cation "High In°ation " is a dummy variable where it takes one in
case that the in°ation rate is higher than 40% quarterly.
However, when the controlling variable for the stabilization plan is included,
none of the variables seem to be signi¯cant.
Then, Table 2.3 shows that in the basic structure the e®ect relative price
variability is signi¯cant and the e®ect of the other two regressors (d and g)a r e
not signi¯cant.
Table 2.3: Long Run Coe±cients
Dependent Variable: kbs
t
Speci¯cation RPV g d CB ¼h Stability Test
Basic Structure 0.89** -0.01 0.35* - - 6.61***
CB Dummy 0.93 {.01 0.034 0.01 - 5.41**
High In°ation 1.17*** {.01 0.33 - {.01 6.72***
Note: One, two and three asterisks indicate signi¯cance
a tt h e1 0 ,5a n d1p e r c e n tr e s p e c t i v e l y .
As we will show in section 4, our theoretical perspective has clear implication
on the behavior of the lending rate over di®erent level of in°ation. The problem
with lending rates in Argentina is the fact that the reported series refer to the
o±cial lending rates, which was controlled and set by the government. The only
interest rate that appears to be market determined is the interbank rate, the
lending rate charged by for short term interbank lending. Even though we do
not try to explain the dynamics of the real rates, ¯gure 2.6 reports this serie6.
Two things appear clear from ¯gure 2.6. First, real interest rates are much
higher in the pre-convertibility law period. And second, the volatility of the real
interest rate is also higher during the pre-convertibility period.
3 Relative Price Variability and In°ation
This paper argues that the relation between in°ation and the bank's portfolio
allocation, established in the previous section is linked to the relationship be-
tween in°ation and relative prices. This section reviews the literature on relative
price variability and in°ation, while in the theoretical section, we will show the
relation between relative price variability and bank's asset allocation.
The relation between the movement of individual relative price with respect
to the aggregate price level has been investigated at least since Mill's (1927)
description of the US price system. Most of the papers suggest that in°ation
and relative price changes are strongly positively correlated. Let's de¯ne RPV as
the deviation of the rates of in°ation of di®erent goods and services around the
average consumer price in°ation. Parks(1978), Fischer (1981) and several others
authors have shown that his measure of price variability, de¯ned as intermarket
price variability, and the aggregate in°ation rate are positively correlated over
time. Similar results was by Glejser (1965) for a cross-section of European
countries.
6Figure 3 does not plot the value of the interest rate between 1989-1991, which is the
hyperin°ation period.
8Some works have attempted to determine whether this relationship is stronger
between in°ation and RPV using both, the anticipated and the unanticipated
change in in°ation. Parks (1978) argued that the relationship was driven by
changes in unanticipated in°ation rather than the level of in°ation. however,
Fischer (1981) regressed RPV on in°ation, changes in in°ation (expected and
unexpected in°ation). He found that both, expected and unexpected in°ation,
had a positive and signi¯cant relationship with RPV. More recently, Debelle
and Lamont (1997) test whether the time-series positive correlation of in°ation
and intermarket relative price variability is also present in a cross section of US
cities. They showed that cities that have higher than average in°ation also have
higher than average relative price dispersion.
Another set of papers look at the empirical relationship between intramarket
price variability, this is the variability of relative prices of a given product across
stores, and the expected and unexpected component of in°ation. Empirically,
it appears that di®erent sellers vary in the timing and size of nominal price
changes. Consequently, there is variability in the price level across identical
products at a point in time, and a number of authors have found a positive
relationship between intramarket price variability and in°ation. Van Hoomis-
sen (1988), Lach and Tsiddon (1992) and Tommasi (1994) used data on the
same product across di®erent stores in countries that were experiencing a high
in°ation rate (Israel 1971-1984 and Argentina 1990, respectively). In addition,
Tommasi (1994) showed that even though an increase in in°ation leads to higher
variability, at very high rates of in°ation the relationship is reversed, and an
increase in in°ation reduces the relative price variance7.
4 Model of Bank Lending and In°ation
Most of the recent theoretical literature on bank lending, following the seminal
contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), has studied the e®ect of asymmetric
information in the lender-borrower relation. A standard result in this literature
predicts that, due to the moral hazard on the part of borrowers and adverse se-
lection among di®erent borrowers, the bank's expected return on a risky loan is
a non monotonic function of the interest rate. In other words, a credit rationing
equilibrium could arise because banks refute to supply loan at the prevailing in-
terest rate to some of the existing customers. One of the easiest way to capture
this mechanism, without explicitly modeling moral hazard or adverse selection
problems, is to assume that entrepreneurs and borrowers are asymmetrically in-
formed on the state of market and monitoring the output of ¯rms has a cost. In
this setting, Williamson (1987) had shown that a standard debt contract is the
optimal arrangement. With respect to the mentioned assumptions, Williamson
associated the monitoring cost as the bankruptcy costs. In addition, according
with the author, asymmetric information means that only the debtor knows
the true output of the project. Following the same idea, we propose a model
7A possible explanation for this event is that at high in°ation rate all prices are quoted in
foreign exchange rate.
9in which heterogenous (with respect to the monitoring cost) and risk-neutral
¯nanciers decide whether to invest their ¯xed endowment between two alterna-
tive assets: a risk-free asset and a lending contract with ex-ante homogeneous
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs and ¯nanciers are matched pairwise at the begin-
ning of the period and in case of disagreement the entrepreneur has no possibility
to change ¯nancier. In other words, ¯nanciers have monopolistic power vis-a-vis
their client, and there is no free entry in the lending market.
Then, if borrowers decide to default, the lender will receive the output of
the project after paying the bankruptcy cost. In the other state, borrowers do
not default, the lender receive the contracted interest rate. Assuming mean
preserving spread distribution for returns of the project, we will study the e®ect
of an increase in the spread of the return distribution on the bank's portfolio
allocation between these two assets.
4.1 Description of the Model
A borrower or entrepreneur would receive from his or her investment project
a random return of ~ pi. In addition, we assume that the returns for each en-
trepreneurs are independent and identically distributes according to the prob-
ability density function f(:) and the probability distribution F(:). For ana-
lytical simplicity, we assume that f is uniformly distributed over the interval
(¹ ¡ b;¹ + b), so that ¹ is the expected return of each project, where this dis-
tribution function is common knowledge. In this setting, the actions of the
entrepreneurs do not a®ect the returns on investment projects, then, moral
hazard is not a problem.
The realization of ~ pi, denoted by pi is costless observed only by entrepreneurs,
while the lender, or ¯nancier, can learn about the state of a particular pi only by
paying a idiosyncratic monitoring cost of °i(ea. bankruptcy cost). Financiers
are heterogenous with respect to the cost °i, and a distribution function H(°i),
de¯ned over the support [0,2b] describes the proportion of lender with idiosyn-
cratic monitoring cost less or equal than °i. Thus, a contract between an en-
trepreneur and a ¯nancier will be a function ½(r¤(°i);°i), that speci¯es the
payment transfer from the entrepreneur to the ¯nancier. In this type of set-
ting, using the result established by Williamson (1987), the optimal contract is
a standard debt contract, which speci¯es that the entrepreneur shall pay the
lender a ¯xed amount r¤ at the end of the period, unless the entrepreneur de-
cides to default on his debt. In that case, the ¯nancier will receive the entire
return of the project after paying the monitoring cost of °i.A s a r e s u l t , t h e











where r¤(°i) is the interest rate, determined by the maximization condition
10r¤(°i) = argmax
r ½(r¤(°i);°i)( 5 )
In equation (2.4), the ¯rst expression represents the expected value of the
project conditional on an entrepreneur decision to default, the second term is
the revenue from the repayment r¤, weighted by the probability of repayment,
while the last term is the expected cost of monitoring. Since the entrepreneur









The ¯rst expression of the above equation refers to the expected revenues
from the project, while the second term is the interest rate cost, weighted by
the surviving probability. While the formal derivation of the equilibrium will
be derived in the next section, from equation (2.4), it would be helpful to show







Regarding the other investment opportunity, ¯nanciers have access to a free
risk investment which yields an expected return equal to i,w i t hi ¹ ¹. By virtue
of the monotonicity of ½(:) with respect to r, the portfolio allocation between the
two assets satis¯es the reservation property. This reservation property could be
described in terms of a reservation cost °d, such that lender with idiosyncratic
e®ort larger than °d invests her portfolio only in the free risk asset. Using
equation (2.5), the reservation e®ort is de¯ned as
½(r¤(°d);°d)=i (8)
Finally, if H(°d) is the proportion of lender who decide to ¯nance the en-
trepreneur, the portfolio allocation in the free risk asset , kbs; would be
kbs =1¡ H(°d)( 9 )
In the next section we derive the equilibrium interest rate and we show that
an increase in the spread of a mean preserving distribution of returns leads
to a decrease in the banking expected pro¯ts, ½(°d) and an increase in the
equilibrium interest rate r¤. This in turn, increases the reservation °d and
increases the proportion of ¯nanciers who decide to invest their portfolio in the
free risk asset.
114.2 The Lending Problem
We solve the problem in two steps. First, we determine the optimal interest rate
for a given entrepreneur °i, ¹ and b. Next, we focus on the portfolio allocation
to derive an analytical expression for the marginal ¯nancier °d. And ¯nally, we
derive the main comparative static property of the model.
In our simple set up, each idiosyncratic ¯nancier °i choose the interest rate







f(p)dp ¡ ° ¤ f(p)=0 ( 1 0 )
Plugging in the above equation the assumed uniform distribution for the
return, equation 2.10 could be rewritten as
1 ¡






for b 6= 0, the equilibrium interest rate charged by ¯nanciers would be
r¤ = ¹ + b ¡ ° (12)
Equation 2.12 shows that there is a unique maximum r¤(°i); and that a
positive interest rate requires °i < 2b. From equation 2.12, it immediately
follows that an increase in the variance of returns, which is an increase in b in the
terminology of this paper, is translated into a higher interest rate,
@r(:)
@b =1> 0.
In addition, plugging the assumed uniform distribution in equation 2.4, the
pro¯t function turn out to be
½ =
r2 ¡ (¹ ¡ b)2
4b
+ r ¡ r
(r ¡ ¹ + b)
2b
¡ °
(r ¡ ¹ + b)
2b
(13)
Figure 2.7 shows the relation between ½ and r given by equation 2.13. This
¯gure shows, for a given variance in returns b a n dc o s to fb a n k r u p t c y°,a
parabolic relation between the ¯nancier expected pro¯t and the interest rate.
In addition, this ¯gure shows that the maximum interest rate is an increasing
function of b,and that the maximum expected pro¯t falls with the increase of b.
This result is formally established in the following way.
Plugging equation 2.12, which is the optimal interest rate r¤ = ¹+b¡°i,i n







4b2 < 0( 1 4 )
12This shows ¯nancier's expected pro¯t is a decreasing function with respect
to the variance of returns.
So far, we derived the optimal interest rate and the e®ect of an increase in
the variance of the return in the expected pro¯t. We are now in a position to
derive a formal expression for the marginal ¯nancier °d.
The cut-o® value °d would be determined by the following condition
°d







pf(p)dp + r ¤ [1 ¡
(r¤ ¡ ¹ + b)
2b
] ¡ i (15)
which states that for the marginal ¯nancier, the expected monitoring cost
are equal to the di®erence between the expected gross return from lending to
an entrepreneur and the return form the free risk asset.
Plugging the equilibrium condition r¤ = ¹ + b ¡ °d in equation 2.15, re-
arranging, the equilibrium cut-o® °d is the solution of the following quadratic
equation
°2 ¡ 4b° +4 b(¹ ¡ i)( 1 6 )
Equation 2.16 is a key equation of the model. This equation determines the
reservation cost °d, whose expression would be8
°d =2 b ¡
p
4b2 ¡ 4b(¹ ¡ i)( 1 7 )
Equation 2.17 explains that the decision to invest in the lending market
depends on both, the di®erence between the two average returns (¹¡i)a n dt h e
variance of returns (b).
From equation 2.17 is clear that
¹ = i ) °d =0
In other words, an arbitrarily small monitoring cost °d is su±cient to invest
the bank's portfolio in the free risk asset when there are no di®erence in the
average return of these two assets.
Figure 2.8 plots the marginal cut-o® (°d) values versus ¹ ¡ i for di®erent
values of the in°ation risk, b. Two points surge from this ¯gure. First, higher
average di®erential ¹¡i means that more ¯nanciers would be willing to concede
loans to entrepreneurs at given b. Second, higher in°ation risk (increase in b)
decreases the amount of ¯nanciers willing to concede credits to entrepreneur.
The later result could be established formally by di®erentiating equation 2.16
to yield
8The positive root is ruled out by the condition that °<2b.
13@°d
@b
(°d ¡ 2b)=2 ( °d ¡ ¹ + i)( 1 8 )
Equation 2.18 implies that since °d < 2b,
@°d
@b < 0i fa n do n l yi f ,( °d¡¹+i) >
0:
Therefore, this implies that as long as in°ation increases the variance of
relative returns without a®ecting the expected return on the risky asset (our
assumption of mean preserving distribution), an increase in the variance would
shift ¯nanciers portfolio allocation towards the free risk asset.
Formally, this result could be obtained by plugging 2.18 in the partial deriva-






> 0( 1 9 )
4.3 Discussion
This paper shows both, a theoretical and an empirical link between in°ation and
bank's portfolio allocation. These results rationalized what Rodriguez (1992)
pointed out with respect to the Central Bank of Argentina, behaving as a "bor-
rower of ¯rst resort". This expression refers to the reallocation of bank's credit
from the private sector to the government.
The e®ect of in°ation will be in the variance of return of the risky assets,
where the increase in in°ation increases the variance of returns. This assumed
relation in our model between in°ation and variance of returns is well estab-
lished in the literature (i.e. Parks(1978), and Fischer (1981) among others). In
this context, the model shows that limited liability on the part of borrowers,
together with asymmetric information and costly monitoring in the borrower-
lender contracts, induces a clear relation between in°ation risk and bank's port-
folio allocation, where an increase in in°ation risk creates the incentive for banks
to invest in free risk assets. Therefore, banks constrain the credit lines to ¯rms,
and as a result the market for private credit disappears.
A competitive theory for this episodes was presented by Calvo and Vegh
(1995). The authors explained that sometimes government used the interest
rate to ¯ght in°ation and defend the currency in many high in°ation countries.
For the special case of Argentina, they showed that, ¯rst, commercial banks
borrowed from the public in time deposit, and second, banks deposited this
m o n e yi nt h eC e n t r a lB a n k .T h e n ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eC e n t r a lB a n ki n t e r e s tr a t e
creates incentive to the public to invest in time deposit, and banks reinvest the
m o n e yi nt h eC e n t r a lb a n k .
T h em a i ni m p l i c a t i o no ft h em o d e li st h a ta ni n c r e a s ei ni n ° a t i o nc r e a t e s
an incentive for banks to do a portfolio reallocation towards free risk assets.
Risk neutral ¯nanciers make their investment decision looking not only at the
expected spread between the risky and risk free assets (¹¡i; in the terminology
of this paper) but also looking at the variance of the risky asset return, b.
14As policy implication, the government should reduce in°ation to eliminate
the misallocation of resources mentioned above. On the other hand, the elimi-
nation of in°ation is not free for the economy. Calvo and Vegh (1998) made a
comprehensive summary of these costs. So, there is a trade-o® in reducing the
in°ation rate between the gain from a correct allocation of resources and a cost
from the stabilization plan. Let us emphasize that this paper discusses a channel
causing the misallocation of resources and not the project evaluation concerning
the reduction of the in°ation rate, which is another issue and another paper.
In addition, given that the results obtained are originated in the assumptions
of asymmetric information of the returns and monitoring cost for the ¯nanciers,
another policy implication, if in°ation remains, is that government should im-
plement policies to reduce these two problems, for example, a better bankruptcy
law.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows a channel where in°ation a®ects the resource allocation in the
economy. This channel is originated in the ¯nancier-entrepreneur relation where
risk-neutral ¯nanciers decide to cut the credit line to the entrepreneur when the
probability of default increases. The increase of the default probability comes
form the fact that an increase in in°ation raises the variability of the asset's
returns.
Empirically, we looked at relation between the dynamic behavior of the com-
position of bank's asset in Argentina between 1983 and 1998 and the relative
price variability, and, we ¯nd a robust relation between the bank's asset alloca-
tion and the relative price variability.
The model predicts that an increase of the asset return variability would: i)
Decrease the bank's pro¯t, ii) Increase the real interest rate, iii) Increase bank's
portfolio of free risk assets.
As policy implication, the ¯rst best to eliminate the cost of the misallocation
of resources is that the government should get ride of the in°ation. On the other
hand, if in°ation remains, the government should implement policies to reduce
the asymmetric information and the monitoring cost, for example improving the
bankruptcy law.
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Bank's Asset Allocation Price Variability
Graph 2.5
Bank's Asset Allocation and Relative Price VariabilityFigure 2.6
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